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Abstract One formal way of studying cooperation and incentive mechanisms
in wireless ad hoc networks is to use game theory. In this respect, simple inter-
action models such as the forwarder’s dilemma have been proposed and used
successfully. However, this type of models is not suited to account for possible
fluctuations of the wireless links of the network. Additionally, it does not allow
one to study the way a node transmits its own packets. At last, the repeated
game models used in the related literature do not allow the important scenario
of nodes with partial information (about the link state and nodes actions) to
be studied. One of the contributions of the present work is precisely to provide
a general approach to integrate all of these aspects. Second, the best perfor-
mance the nodes can achieve under partial information is fully characterized
for a general form of utilities. Third, we derive an equilibrium transmission
strategy which allows a node to adapt its transmit power levels and packet for-
warding rate to link fluctuations and other nodes actions. The derived results
are illustrated through a detailed numerical analysis for a network model built
from a generalized version of the forwarder’s dilemma. The analysis shows in
particular that the proposed strategy is able to operate in presence of chan-
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nel fluctuations and to perform significantly better than existing transmission
mechanisms (e.g., in terms of consumed network energy).
Keywords
Packet transmission, Power control, Game theory, Repeated games, Incen-
tive mechanisms, Wireless ad hoc networks.
1 Introduction
In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes are interdependent. One node needs the
assistance of neighboring nodes to relay the packets or messages it wants to
send to the receiver(s). Therefore, nodes are in the situation where they have
to relay packets, but have at the same time to manage the energy they spend
for helping other nodes. To capture the tradeoff between a cooperative behav-
ior (which is necessary to convey information through an ad hoc network) and
a selfish behavior (which is necessary to manage the node energy), the authors
of [2] proposed a simple but efficient model. Their modeling has been found
to be very important and insightful in the literature of ad hoc networks, as
advocated by the many papers where it is exploited. The model consists in
assuming, whatever the size of the network, that the local node interaction
only involves two neighboring nodes having a decision-making role; one of the
virtues of considering the interaction to be local is the possibility of designing
distributed transmission strategies. In the original model of [2], a node has
two possible choices namely, forward or drop the packets it receives from the
neighboring node. As shown in [2], modeling the problem at hand as a game
appears to be natural and relevant; in the corresponding game, the node util-
ity function consists of the addition of a data rate term (which is maximized
when the other node forwards its packets) and an energy term (which is max-
imized when the node does not forward the packets of the other node). At
the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding strategic-form static game (called
the forwarder’s dilemma in the corresponding literature), nodes don’t transmit
at all [2]. To avoid this, cooperation has to be stimulated e.g., by studying
the repeated interaction between the nodes [2], [3], [4] or by implementing
incentive mechanisms [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. The vast majority of incen-
tive mechanisms either rely on the idea of reputation [4], [6], [11] or the use
of a credit system [5], [7], [12], [13]. While providing an efficient solution, all
the corresponding models still have some limitations, especially regarding link
quality fluctuations and partial knowledge at the nodes; indeed, they do not
take into account the quality of the link between the transmitting and the
receiving nodes, which may be an important issue since the link quality may
strongly fluctuate if it is wireless. The solution in [8] referred to as ICARUS
(for hybrId inCentive mechAnism for coopeRation stimUlation in ad hoc net-
workS), combines the two ideas namely, reputation and credit system, but it is
not suited to scenarios where the actions of the other nodes are not perfectly
observed, which results e.g., in inappropriate punishment (a node is declared
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selfish while it is cooperative) and therefore in a loss of efficiency. Additionally,
in [8], when a node is out of credit, the transmission is blocked and the node
cannot send any packet anymore; this might be not practical in some wireless
networks where a certain quality-of-service has to be provided. Also [8] pro-
poses a mechanism to regulate the credit when a node has an excessive number
of credits, but the proposed mechanism may be too complex. At last but not
least, in [8] no result is provided on the strategic stability property, which
is important and even necessary to make the network robust against selfish
deviations. The purpose of this paper is precisely to overcome the limitations
of the aforementioned previous works. More precisely, the contributions of the
present paper are as follows.
I The first key technical difference with the closely related works is that the
proposed formulation accounts for the possible presence of quality fluctua-
tions of the different links that are involved in the considered local interaction
model. In particular, this leads us to a game model which generalizes the exist-
ing models since the forwarding game has now a state and the discrete action
sets are arbitrary, not just binary; additionally, the node does not only choose
the cooperation power but also the power used to send its own packets.
I An important and useful contribution of the paper is to characterize the
feasible utility region of the considered problem, by exploiting implementabil-
ity theorems provided by recent works [14], [15], [16]. This problem is known
to be non-trivial in the presence of partial information and constitutes a deter-
mining element of folk theorems; this difficult problem turns out to be solvable
in the proposed reasonable setting (the channel gains are i.i.d. and the obser-
vation structure is memoryless). The knowledge of the utility region is very
useful since it allows one to measure the efficiency of any distributed algorithm
relying on the assumed partial information.
I A third contribution of the paper is that we provide a new transmission
strategy whose main features is to be able to deal with the presence of fluc-
tuating link qualities and to be efficient. To design the proposed strategy, we
show that the derived utility region can be used in a constructive manner to
obtain efficient operating points, and propose a new incentive mechanism to
ensure that these points are equilibrium points. The proposed incentive mech-
anism combines the ideas of credit and reputation. To our knowledge, the
closest existing incentive mechanism to the one proposed in the present paper
is given in [8]. Here, we go further by dealing with the problem of imperfect
observation and that of credit outage or excess. Indeed, the credit evolution
law we propose in this paper prevents, by construction, the number of credits
from being too large; therefore one does not need to resort to an additional
credit regulation mechanism, which may be too complex.
I In addition to the above analytical contributions, we provide a numerical
study which demonstrates the relevance of the proposed approach. Compared
to the closest transmission strategies, significant gains are obtained both in
terms of packet forwarding rate, network consumed power, and combined util-
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ities. As a sample result, the network consumed power is shown to be divided
by more than two w.r.t. state-of-the art strategies [8] and [17].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we present the
system model; the assumed local interaction model involves two neighboring
nodes of an ad hoc network with arbitrary size and generalizes the famous
model introduced in [2]. The associated static game model is also provided
in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, the repeated game formulation of the generalized packet
forwarding problem is provided; one salient feature of the proposed model is
that partial information is assumed both for the network state and the nodes
actions. In Sec. 4, the feasible utility region of the studied repeated game
with partial observation is fully characterized. We also provide an algorithm
to determine power control policies that are shown to be globally efficient
in Sec. 6. The proposed incentive mechanism and equilibrium transmission
strategy are provided in Sec. 5; the proposed transmission strategy allows both
the packet forwarding rate and the transmit power to be adapted. A detailed
numerical performance analysis is conducted in Sec. 6. Sec. 7 concludes the
paper.
2 System model
The present work concerns wireless ad hoc networks namely, networks in which
a source node needs the assistance of other nodes to communicate with the
destination node(s). As well motivated in related papers such as [4], [18], [19],
we will assume the interaction among nodes to be local i.e., it only involves
neighboring nodes. This means that the network can have an arbitrary size
and topology but a node only considers local interactions to take its decision
although it effectively interacts with more nodes. One of the virtues of such
an interaction model is to be able to design distributed transmission
strategies for every node. More specifically, we will assume the famous model
of [2] in which local interactions take place in a pairwise manner, which not
only allow us to design distributed strategies but also to easily compare the
proposed transmission strategy with existing strategies. The key idea of this
relevant model is to take advantage of the fact that the network is wireless
to simplify the interaction model. For a given node, the dominant interaction
will only involve its closest neighbors (see Fig. 1). If several neighboring nodes
lie within the radio range of the considered node, then it is assumed to have
several pairwise interactions in parallel, as explained in detail in the numerical
part.
The nodes are assumed to be non-malicious i.e., each of them does not aim
at damaging the communication of the other. Additionally, they are assumed
to operate in an imperfect promiscuous mode, which means that each node
imperfectly overhears all packets forwarded by their neighbors. The proposed
model generalizes the model [2] for at least four reasons. First, the action of
a node has two components instead of one: the transmit power used to help
the other node, which is denoted by p′i; the transmit power used to send its







































Fig. 1 In this example, the focus is on what Node 1 does to allow Node 0 (source) to route
its packets to Node 4 (destination). The dashed circle represents the radio range for Node
1 and defines its neighbors. To ensure a distributed design, two key elements are exploited:
a) Node 1 adopts its transmission behavior to each of its neighbors. Here, Node 1 interacts
with Node 2 (indicated by the dotted box); b) Only the available knowledge of the quality
of the most influential links is accounted for (denoted generically by h1, h′1, h2, h
′
2)
own packets, which is denoted by pi. Second, the transmit power levels are
not assumed to be binary but to lie in a general discrete set1 Pi = P ′i = P =
{P1, P2, ..., PL} = {Pmin, . . . , Pmax}, |Pi| = |P ′i| = |P| = L. Assuming that the
sets are discrete is of practical interest, as there exist wireless communication
standards in which the power can only be decreased or increased by step and
in which quantized wireless channel state information (CSI) is used (see e.g.,
[20], [21]). Similarly, the channel may be quantized to define operating modes
(e.g., MCS -modulation coding scheme) used by the transmitter. Even when
the effective channel is continuous, assuming it to be discrete in the model
and algorithm part may be very relevant. At last, note that from the limiting
performance characterization point of view, the analysis of the continuous
case follows from the discrete case but the converse is not true [22]. As a third
new feature compared to [2], the considered model accounts for the possible
fluctuations of the quality of each link. With each link a non-negative scalar is
associated, which is called the channel gain of the considered link. For a node,
the channel gains of the links used to send its own packets and to help the other
node, are denoted by hi and h
′
i, respectively. These channel gains are assumed
to lie in discrete sets (of states):Hi = H′i = H = {hmin, . . . , hmax} with |Hi| =
|H′i| = |H| = H; the realizations of each channel gain will be assumed to be
i.i.d.. Technically, continuous channel gains might be assumed. But, as done in
the information theory literature for establishing coding theorems, we address
the discrete case in the first place, since the continuous case can be obtained by
1 The notation |.| stands for the cardinality of the considered set.
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classical arguments (such as assuming standard probability spaces), whereas
the converse is not true. Now, from the practical aspect, quantizing the channel
gains typically induces a small performance loss compared to the continuous
case; one figure assuming a typical scenario illustrates this. The corresponding
channel gain model naturally applies to time-selective frequency flat fading
single-input single-output channels. If the channel gain is interpreted as the
combined effect of path loss and shadowing, our model can also be used to
study more general channel models such as MIMO channels. Fourth, the utility
function of a node has a more general form than in the forwarder’s dilemma.
The instantaneous utility function for Node i ∈ {1, 2} expresses as follows:
ui(a0, a1, a2) = ϕ(SNRi)− α(pi + p′i), (1)
where:




2) is the global channel or network state. The correspond-
ing set will be denoted by A0 = H1 ×H′1 ×H2 ×H′2 = H4;
– ai = (pi, p
′
i) is the action of Node i ∈ {1, 2};
– the function ϕ is a communication efficiency function which represents
the packet success rate. It is assumed to be increasing and lie in [0, 1]. A
typical choice for ϕ is for example, ϕ(x) = (1−e−x)`, ` being the number of
symbols per packet (see e.g., [23], [24], [25]) or ϕ(x) = e−
c
x with c = 2r−1,
r being the spectral efficiency in bit/s per Hz [26];
– for i ∈ {1, 2}, the quantity SNRi is, for Node i, the equivalent signal-to-










σ2 being the noise variance and the index notation −i standing for the
index of the other node.
Remark 1. The results derived in Sec. 4 hold for any utility function under
the form ui(a0, a1, a2) (under some assumptions which only concern the obser-
vation structure) and not only for the specific choice made above. This choice
is made to allow comparisons with existing results (and more specifically with
the large set of contributions on the forwarder’s dilemma) to be conducted
and discussed.
Remark 2. The assumed expression of the SNR is also one possible pragmatic
choice but all the analytical results derived in this paper hold for an arbitrary
SNR expression of the form SNRi(a0, a1, a2); this choice is sufficiently general
to study the problem of channel fluctuations which is the main feature to be
accounted for. The proposed expression is relevant e.g., when nodes imple-
ment the amplify-and-forward protocol to relay the signals or packets [27].
This simple but reasonable model for the SNR may either be seen as an ap-
proximation where the single-hop links dominate the multi-hop links or the
talk/listen phases are scheduled appropriately. If another relaying protocol is
implemented such as decode-and-forward, other expressions for the equivalent
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SNR may be used (see e.g., [28]) without questioning the validity of the an-
alytical results provided in this paper. At last, the parameter α ≥ 0 in (1)
allows one to assign more or less importance to the energy consumption of
the node. Indeed, as in [2], the first term of the utility function represents the
benefit of transmitting (i.e., the goodput) while the second term represents
the cost of transmitting (i.e., the spent energy).
The pair of functions (u1, u2) defines a strategic-form static game (see
e.g., [29]) in which the players are Nodes 1 and 2 and the action sets are
respectively A1 = P2 and A2 = P2. This game generalizes the forwarder’s
dilemma introduced in [2]. The latter can be retrieved by assuming that ϕ
is a step function, p′i is binary, pi is constant, and all the channel gains are
constant. In the next section, we describe mathematically the problem under
investigation. It is shown how the problem can be modeled by a repeated game,
which is precisely built on the stage or static game:
G = (N , {Ai}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) , (3)
where N = {1, 2}.
The unique Nash equilibrium of G is pi,NE = Pmin and pi′,NE = Pmin. If the
minimum power Pmin is taken to be zero, then the situation where the nodes do
not transmit at all corresponds to the equilibrium (and thus (u1, u2) = (0, 0)),
which clearly shows one of the interests in modeling the packet transmission
problem as a repeated game.
3 Repeated game formulation of the problem
The problem we want to solve in this paper is as follows. It is assumed that the
nodes interact over an infinite number of stages. Over stage t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T},
T → ∞, the channel gains are assumed to be fixed while the realizations of
each channel gain are assumed to be i.i.d. from stage to stage. During a stage,
a node typically exchanges many packets with its neighbors. At each stage, a
node has to make a decision based on the knowledge it has. In full generality,
the decision of a node consists in choosing a probability distribution over its
set of possible actions. The knowledge of a node is in terms of global channel
states and actions chosen by the other node. More precisely, it is assumed that
Node i ∈ N , has access to a signal which is associated with the state a0 and is
denoted by si ∈ Si, |Si| < ∞. At stage t, the observation si(t) ∈ Si therefore
corresponds to the image (i.e., the knowledge) that Node i has about the global
channel state a0(t). This signal is assumed to be the output of a memoryless
observation structure [27]2 whose conditional probability is denoted by ki:
ki(si|a0) = Pr[Si = si|A0 = a0], (4)
where capital letters stand for random variables whereas, small letters stand for
realizations. Simple examples for si are: si = hi; si = ĥi, ĥi being an estimate
2 The memoryless assumption means that for sequences of realizations of size t (t being
arbitrary), Pr(yti |at0, at1, at2) = Πtt′=1Pr(yi(t
′)|a0(t′), a1(t′), a2(t′)).
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of hi; si = (hi, h
′




2). Now, in terms of observed
actions, it is assumed that Node i ∈ N has imperfect monitoring. In general,
Node i ∈ N has access to a signal yi ∈ Yi, |Yi| <∞, which is assumed to be the
output of a memoryless observation structure whose conditional probability is
denoted by Γi:
Γi(yi|a0, a1, a2) = Pr[Yi = yi|(A0, A1, A2) = (a0, a1, a2)]. (5)
The reason why we distinguish between the observations si and yi comes from
the assumptions made in terms of causality. Indeed, practically speaking, it
is relevant to assume that a node has access to the past realizations of si in
the wide sense namely, to si(1), ..., si(t) at stage t. However, only the past
realizations in the strict sense yi(1), ..., yi(t − 1) are assumed to be known at
stage t. Otherwise, it would mean that a node would have access to the image
of its current action and that of the others before choosing the former.
At this point, it is possible to define completely the problem to be solved.
The problem can be tackled by using a strategic-form game model, which is
denoted by G. As for the static game G on which the repeated game model G
is built on, the set of players is the set of nodes N = {1, 2}. The transmission
strategy of the Node i is denoted by σi and consists of a sequence of functions
and is defined as follows:





i ) 7→ πi(t),
(6)
where:
– sti = (si(1), . . . , si(t)), y
t−1
i = (yi(1), . . . , yi(t− 1));
– ∆(P2) represents the unit simplex namely, the set of probability distribu-
tions over the set P2;
– πi(t) is the probability distribution used by the Node i at stage t to generate
its action (pi(t), p
′
i(t)).
The type of strategies we are considering is referred to as a behavior strategy in
the game theory literature, which means that at every game stage the strategy
returns a probability distribution. The associated randomness not only allows
one to consider strategies which are more general than pure strategies, but
also to model effects such as node asynchronicity for packet transmissions. At
last, the performance of a node is measured over the long run and nodes are
therefore assumed to implement transmission strategies which aim at maxi-
mizing their long-term utilities. The long-term utility function of Node i ∈ N
is defined as:












Pt(a0, a1, a2)ui(a0, a1, a2),
(7)
where:
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– σi stands for the transmission strategy of Node i ∈ N ;
– it is assumed that the limit in (7) exists;
– θt is a sequence of weights which corresponds to a convex combination
that is, 0 ≤ θt < 1 and
∑T
t=1 θt = 1. For a repeated game with discount
θt = (1− δ)δt and for a classical infinitely repeated game θt = 1T ;
– as already mentioned, capital letters stand for random variables whereas,
small letters stand for realizations. Here A0(t), A1(t), and A2(t) stand for
the random processes corresponding to the network state and the nodes
actions;
– the notation Pt stands for the joint probability distribution induced by the
strategy profile (σ1, σ2) at stage t.
This general model thus encompasses the two well-known models for the se-
quence of weights which are given by the model with discount and the infinite
Cesaro-mean. In the model with discount, note that the discount factor may
model different phenomena but in a wireless ad hoc network, the most rel-
evant effect to be modeled seems to be the uncertainty that there will be a
subsequent iteration of the stage game, for example, connectivity to an access
point can be lost. With this interpretation in mind, the discounting factor
represents e.g., the probability that the current round is not the last one or,
in terms of mobility, it may also represent the probability that the nodes do
not move for the current stage. Therefore it may model the departure or the
death of a node (e.g., due to connectivity loss) for a given routing path. More
details about these interpretation can be found in [2], [29] while [30] provides
a convincing technical analysis to sustain this probabilistic interpretation.
At this point, we have completely defined the strategic-form of the repeated
game that is, the triplet
G = (N , {Σi}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N ) , (8)
where Σi is the set of all possible transmission strategies for Node i ∈ N .
One of the main objectives of this paper is to exploit the above formulation
to find a globally efficient transmission scheme for the nodes. For this purpose,
we will characterize long-term utility region for the problem under considera-
tion. It is important to mention that the characterization of the feasible utility
region of a dynamic game (which includes repeated games as a special case)
with an arbitrary observation structure is still an open problem [31]. Remark-
ably, as shown recently in [14], [15], the problem can be solved for an interesting
class of problems. It turns out that the problem under investigation belongs
to this class provided that the channel gains evolve according to the classical
model of block i.i.d. realizations.
In the next section, we show how to exploit [14], [15] to characterize the
long-term utility region and construct a practical transmission strategy. In
Sec. 5, we will show how to integrate the strategic stability3 property into this
strategy, this property being important to ensure that selfish nodes effectively
implement the efficient strategies.
3 We will refer to the stability of a point to single deviations as strategic stability.
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4 Long-term utility region characterization
When the number of stages is assumed to be large, the random process associ-
ated with the network state A0(1), A0(2), ..., A0(T ) is i.i.d. and, the observation
structure given by (k1,k2, Γ1, Γ2) is memoryless, some recent results can be
exploited to characterize the feasible utility region of the considered repeated
game and to derive efficient transmission strategies. The main difficulty to
determine the feasible utility region of G is to find the set of possible average
correlations between a0, a1, and a2. Formally, the correlation averaged over T
stages is defined by:





Pt(a0, a1, a2), (9)
where Pt is the joint probability at stage t. More precisely, a key notion to
characterize the attainable long-term utilities is the notion of implementability,
which is given as follows.
Definition 1 An average correlation Q is said to be implementable if there
exists a pair of transmission strategies (σ1, σ2) such that the average correlation
induced by these transmission strategies verifies:







Pt(a0, a1, a2) = Q(a0, a1, a2).
(10)
Using the above definition, the following key result can be proved.
Proposition 1 The Pareto-frontier of the achievable utility region of G is
given by all the points under the form (EQλ(u1),EQλ(u2)), λ ∈ [0, 1], where
Qλ is a maximum point of
Wλ = λEQ(u1) + (1− λ)EQ(u2), (11)
and each maximum point is taken in the set of probability distributions which
factorize as follows:
Q(a0, a1, a2) =
∑
v,s1,s2
ρ(a0)PV (v)× k(s1, s2|a0)×
PA1|S1,V (a1|s1, v)PA2|S2,V (a2|s2, v), (12)
where:
– λ denotes the relative weight assigned to the utility of the first player and
can be chosen arbitrarily depending on some prescribed choice e.g., in terms
of fairness or global efficiency;
– ρ is the probability distribution of the network state a0;
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– k is the joint conditional probability which defines the assumed observation
structure i.e., a probability which writes as4
k(s1, s2|a0) = Pr[(S1, S2) = (s1, s2)|A0 = a0]; (13)
– V ∈ V is an auxiliary random variable or lottery.
(See the proof in the appendix). One interesting comment to be made con-
cerns the presence of the ”parameter” or auxiliary variable V . The presence of
the auxiliary variable is quite common in information-theoretic performance
analyses and in game-theoretic analyses through the notion of external cor-
relation devices (such as those assumed to implement correlated equilibria).
Indeed, V ∈ V is an auxiliary random variable or lottery which can be proved
to improve the performance in general (see [14] for more details). Such a lot-
tery may be implemented by sampling a signal which is available to all the
transmitters e.g., an FM or a GPS signal.
In (22), ρ and k are given. Thus, Wλ has to be maximized with respect
to the triplet (PA1|S1,V , PA2|S2,V , PV ). In this paper, we restrict our attention
to the optimization of (PA1|S1,V , PA2|S2) for a fixed lottery PV and leave the
general case as an extension.
The maximization problem of the functional Wλ(PA1|S1,V , PA2|S2,V ) with
respect to PA1|S1,V and PA2|S2,V amounts to solving a bilinear program. The
corresponding bilinear program can be tackled numerically by using iterative
techniques such as the one proposed in [32], but global convergence is not
guaranteed and therefore some optimality loss may be observed. Two other
relevant numerical techniques have also been proposed in [33]. The first tech-
nique is based on a cutting plane approach while the second one consists of an
enlarging polytope approach. For both techniques, convergence may also be an
issue since for the first technique, no convergence result is provided and for the
second technique, cycles may appear [34]. To guarantee convergence and man-
age the computational complexity issue, we propose here another numerical
iterative technique namely, to exploit the sequential best-response dynamics
(see e.g., [35] for a reference in the game theory literature, [29] for applications
examples in the wireless area, [36] for a specific application to power control
over interference channels). Here also, some efficiency loss may be observed,
but it will be shown to be relatively small for the quite large set of scenar-
ios we have considered in the numerical performance analysis. The sequential
best-response dynamics applied to the considered problem translates into the
following algorithm.
Algorithm 1.
1. Initialization. The arguments of the functional Wλ are fixed to an initial





2. Iteration. At iteration n ≥ 1, P (n)Ai|Si,V is updated by being chosen in the
argmax of Wλ(PAi|Si,V , P
(n−1)
A−i|S−i,V ). If there are several maximum points,
choose one of them randomly and according to a uniform law.
4 Note that k1 and k2 are directly obtained from k by a simple marginalization operation.
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η for some η ≥ 0.
Although suboptimal in general (as the available state-of-the art tech-
niques), the proposed technique is of particular interest for at last three rea-
sons. First, convergence is unconditional. It can be proved to be guaranteed
e.g., by induction or by identifying the proposed procedure as an instance
of the sequential best-response dynamics for an exact potential game (any
game with a common utility is an exact potential game). Second, conver-
gence points are local maximum points but in all the simulations performed
those maximums had the virtue of not being too far from the global max-
imum. At last but not least, it allows us to build a practical transmission
strategy which outperforms all the state-of-the art transmission strategies, as
explained next. Note that this is necessarily the case when Algorithm 1 is
initialized with the state-of-the art transmission strategy under consideration.
Although we will not tackle the classical issue of the influence of initialization
on the convergence point, it is worth mentioning that many simulations have
shown that the impact of the initial point on the performance at convergence
is typically small, at least for the utilities under consideration. Therefore, ini-
tializing Algorithm 1 with naive strategies such as transmitting at full power
∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}, (a1(t), a2(t)) = (Pmax, Pmax, Pmax, Pmax) is well suited.
Remark 3. Algorithm 1 would typically be implemented offline in prac-
tice. The purpose of Algorithm 1 is to generate decision functions which are
exploited by the proposed transmission strategy. To implement Algorithm 1,
only statistics need to be estimated in practice (namely, the channel distri-
bution ρ and the observation structure conditional distribution k); estimating
statistics such as the channel distribution information is known to be a classical
issue in the communications literature.
5 Proposed equilibrium transmission strategy
The main purpose of this section is to obtain globally efficient transmission
strategies. Here, global efficiency is measured in terms of social welfare namely,
in terms of the sum U1 +U2. This corresponds to choosing λ =
1
2 . This choice
is pragmatic and follows to what is often done in the literature; it implicitly
means that the network nodes have the same importance. Otherwise, this
parameter can always be chosen to operate at the desired point of the utility
region. Indeed, social welfare is a well-known measure of efficiency and it also
allows one to build other famous efficiency measure of a distributed network
such as the price of anarchy [37]. The proposed approach holds for any other
feasible point of the utility region which is characterized in the preceding
section.
The transmission strategy we propose comprises three ingredients: 1) a
well-chosen operating point of the utility region; 2) the use of reputation [4], [6];
3) the use of virtual credit [5], [7].
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1. The proposed operating point is obtained by applying the sequential best-
response dynamics procedure described in Sec. 4 and choosing λ = 0.5,
|V| = 1. Each individual maximization operation provides a probability
distribution which is denoted by π?i . Since Wλ is linear in PAi|Si,V , the
maximization operation returns a point which is one of the vertices of
the unit simplex. The corresponding probability distribution has thus a
particular form namely, that of a decision function under the form f?i (si).
Therefore, when operating at this point, at stage t, Node i chooses its
action to be ai(t) = f
?
i (si(t)). This defines for Node i a particular choice
of a lottery over its possible actions; this lottery is denoted by π?i (t) and is
the unit simplex of dimension 2L i.e., ∆(P2). By convention, the possible
actions for Node i are ordered according to a lexicographic ordering. Having
π?i (t) = (1, 0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ ∆(P2) means that action (P1, P1) is used with
probability 1 (wp1); having π?i (t) = (0, 1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ ∆(P2) means that
action (P1, P2) is used wp1; ...; having π
?
i (t) = (0, 0, 0, ..., 0, 1) ∈ ∆(P2)
means that action (PL, PL) is used wp1.
2. The reputation (see e.g., [4], [8], [38]) of a neighboring node is evaluated
as follows. Over each game stage duration, the nodes exchanges a certain
number of packets which is denoted by K. This number is typically large.
Since each node has access to the realizations of the signal yi for each
packet, it can exploit it to evaluate the reputation of the other node at
stage t. In this section, we assume a particular observation structure Γ1,
Γ2, which is tailored to the considered problem of packet forwarding in ad
hoc networks. We assume that the signal yi is binary: yi ∈ {D,F}. Let
ε ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter which represents the probability of misdetection.
If Node i chooses the action amin = (Pmin, Pmin) (resp. any other action of
P2i ), then with probability 1− ε, Node −i receives the signal D (resp. F).
With probability ε, Node −i perceives what we define as the action Drop
D (resp. Forward F) while the action Forward F (resp. Drop D) has been
chosen by Node i. Thus, Γi takes the following form:
Γi(yi|x0, a1, a2) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− ε if yi = F and a−i ∈ AFi ,
ε otherwise,
(14)
where AFi = Pi × Pi \ {0}.
Using these notations, Node i can compute the reputation of Node −i as
follows:
R−i(t) =
(1− ε)|{yi = F}|+ ε|{yi = D}|
K
, (15)
where |{yi = F}| and |{yi = D}| are respectively the numbers of occur-
rences of the action Forward and Drop among the K packets Node i has
been needing the assistance of Node −i to forward its packets. The rep-
utation R−i(t) is one of the tools we use to implement the transmission
strategy which is described further. Note that one of the interesting features
of the proposed mechanism is that reputation (15) of Node −i only exploits
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local observations (first-hand reputation information [38]); Node i does not
need any information about the behavior of its neighboring nodes. This con-
trasts with the closest existing reputation mechanisms such as [4], [8] for
which the reputation estimation procedure exploits information obtained
from other nodes (second-hand information [38]). The corresponding in-
formation exchange induces additional signaling [8] and additional energy
consumption. At last, by using these techniques, selfish nodes may collude
and disseminate false reputation values.
3. The idea of virtual credit is assumed to be implemented with a similar
approach to previous works [7], [8] namely, we assume that the nodes have
an initial amount of credits, impose a cost in terms of spent credits for
a node that wants to transmit through a neighbor at a certain frequency
or probability, and that are rewarded when they forward their neighbors’
packets. The reward and cost assumed in this paper are defined next.
The proposed transmission strategy is as follows. While the node has not
enough credit, it adopts a cooperative decision rule, which corresponds to op-
erating at the point we have just described. Otherwise, it adopts a signal-based
tit-for-tat decision rule. Existing tit-for-tat decision rules such as GTFT [17]
do not take into account the possible existence of a state for the game and
therefore the existence of a signal associated with the realization of the state.
Additionally, the proposed tit-for-tat decision rule also takes into account the
fact that action monitoring is not perfect. In contrast with the conventional
setup assumed to implement tit-for-tat or its variants, the action set of a
node is not binary. Therefore we have to give a meaning to tit-for-tat in the
considered setup. The proposed meaning is as follows. When Node i receives
the signal D and Node −i has effectively chosen the action Drop it means
that Node −i has chosen a−i = amin = (Pmin, Pmin). When Node i receives
the signal Forward and Node −i has effectively chosen the action Forward it
means that Node −i has chosen a−i = a?−i = f?−i(s−i). Implementing tit-for-
tat for Node i means choosing ai = a
min = (Pmin, Pmin) (which represents
the counterpart of the action Drop) if the Node −i is believed to have chosen
the action a−i = a
min = (Pmin, Pmin). On the other hand, Node i chooses the
best action a?i = f
?
i (si) when it perceives that Node −i has chosen the action
a?−i = f
?
−i(s−i). Note that, contrarily to the conventional tit-for-tat decision
rule, the actions a?i and a
?
−i differ in general. Denoting by mi(t) ≥ 0 the credit
of Node i at stage t, the proposed strategy expresses formally as follows. We
will refer to this transmission strategy as SARA (for State Aware tRAnsmis-
sion strategy).
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– the virtual credit mi(t) obeys the following evolution law:
mi(t) = mi(t− 1) + β < πi(t− 1), ek > −βνi(t− 1), (17)
βνi(t− 1) represents the virtual monetary cost for Node i when its packet
arrival rate is νi(t − 1), with β ≥ 0; <;> stands for the scalar product;
ek is the k
th vector of the canonical basis of R2L namely, all components
equal 0 except the kth component which equals 1. The index k is given by
the index of action a?i (t) = f
?
i (si(t));
– µ ≥ 0 is a fixed parameter which represents the cooperation level of the
nodes. A sufficient condition on µ and β to guarantee that the nodes have
always enough credits is that µ ≥ 2β;
– the distribution π̂−i(t− 1) is constructed as follows:
π̂−i(t− 1) = R−i(t− 1)π?i (t) + [1−R−i(t− 1)]πmin, (18)
with πmin = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R2L representing the pure action amin =
(Pmin, Pmin).
Comment 1. The second term of the dynamical equation which defines
the credit evolution corresponds to the reward a node obtains when it forwards
the packets of the other node. On the other hand, the third term is the cost paid
by the node for asking the assistance of the other node to forward. The same
weight (namely, β) is applied on both terms to incite the node to cooperate.
Additionally, such a choice allows one from preventing cooperative nodes to
have an excessive number of credits, thus to avoid using a mechanism such as
in [8] to regulate the number of credits. In [8], the credit excess occurs because
the reward in terms of credits only depends on the node action and the cost
only depends on the relaying node action. Thus, when the node is cooperative
and the relaying node is selfish, there will be a reward but not a cost. As for
the credit system, in practice it might be implemented either by assuming
the existence of an external central trusted entity [8], [13] that stores and
manages the nodes credits, or through a credit counter located in the node
and maintained by a tamper-resistant security module (see e.g., [5], [7] for
more details). Thus, in practice the operation of this module would not be
altered, because it would be designed so that information be accessible only
by specific software containing appropriate security measures.
Comment 2. Depending on whether packet forwarding rate maximization
or energy minimization is sought, it is possible to tune the triplet of parameters
(mi(0), β, µ) according to what is desired. In this respect, it can be checked
that the best packet forwarding rate is obtained by choosing any triplet under
the form (2β, β, 2β) for any β > 0. But the power (which is defined by the
quantity ANP defined through (21)) is then at its maximum. On the other
hand, if the triplet of parameters takes the form (mi(0), 0, 0), with mi(0) ≥ 0,
the consumed network power will be at its minimum and the packet forward-
ing rate will be minimized as well. Other choices for the triplet (mi(0), β, µ)
therefore lead to various tradeoffs in terms of transmission rate and consumed
power.
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Comment 3. The proposed strategy can always be used in practice whether
or not it corresponds to an equilibrium point of G. However, if the strategic
stability property is desired, some conditions have to be added to ensure that
it corresponds to an equilibrium. Indeed, effectively operating at an efficient
point in the presence of self-interested and autonomous nodes is possible if the
latter have no interest in changing their transmission strategy. More formally,
a point which possesses the property of strategic stability or Nash equilibrium
is defined as follows.
Definition 2 A strategy profile (σNE1 , σ
NE
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium point for G
if
∀i ∈ N ,∀σi ∈ Σi, Ui(σNE1 , σNE2 ) ≥ Ui(σi, σNE−i ). (19)
In order to obtain an explicit condition for the proposed strategy to be an
equilibrium we consider, as the closest related works [4], a repeated game with
discount. This also allows some effects such as the loss of network connectivity
to be captured. Remarkably, for the repeated game model with discount, the
subgame5 perfection property is also available. This is useful in practice since it
offers some robustness in terms of node behavior. Indeed, this property makes
the equilibrium strategy robust against changes in terms of node behavior
which might occur during the transmission process; even if some deviations
from equilibrium occurred in the past, players have an interest in coming back
to equilibrium. A necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to
be subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume that ∀t ≥ 1, θt = (1 − δ)δt, 0 < δ < 1. The strategy
profile (σ?1 , σ
?






















i−u2i ). u1i = ui(a0, a?1, amin),






i = ui(a0, a





(See the proof in the appendix)
Comment 4. The proposed transmission strategy is compatible with a
packet delivery mechanism such as an ACK/NACK mechanism. Indeed, in
the definition of the transmission strategies (6), the observed signal yi may
correspond to a binary feedback such as an ACK/NACK feedback. Indeed,
yi corresponds to an image of (a0, a1, a2). Such image might then be a bi-
nary version of the receive SNR or SINR (e.g., if the receive SNR is greater
than a threshold then the packet is well received and the corresponding feed-
back signal yi will be ACK). More generally, a binary feedback of the form
Forward/Drop is completely compatible with the presence of ACK/NACK
5 A subgame of the repeated game is a game that starts at a stage t with a given history.
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feedback-type mechanisms. Simply, the signal Drop may combine the effects
of a selfish behavior and bad channel conditions.
Comment 5. This section shows that the proposed transmission strategy
has five salient features.
1. First of all, in contrast with the related works on the forwarder’s dilemma,
it is able to deal with the problem of time-varying link qualities.
2. Second, it not only deals with the adaptation of the cooperation power p′i
of Node i (which is the power to forward the packets of the other node)
but also the power to transmit its own packets pi.
3. Third, the proposed strategy is built in a way to exploit the available ar-
bitrary knowledge about the global channel state (a0) as well as possible.
The key observation for this is to exploit the provided utility region char-
acterization. Ideally, the nodes should operate on the Pareto frontier. This
is possible if a suited optimal algorithm is used.
4. Fourth, the proposed transmission strategy is shown to possess the strate-
gic stability property in games with discount under an explicit sufficient
condition on the discount factor. Note that, here again, each node has only
imperfect monitoring of the actions chosen by the other node. Additionally,
the equilibrium strategy is subgame perfect.
5. Fifth, the proposed strategy does not induce any problem of credit outage
or excess. Credit outage is avoided only if the conditions µ ≥ 2β and (20)
are satisfied. Therefore, if there is no credit outage problem, there is not
need for assisting distant nodes as required in [8].
6 Numerical performance analysis
All simulations provided in this section have been obtained by an ad hoc simu-
lator developed under Matlab. The simulation setup we consider in this paper
is very close to those assumed in the closest works and [4], [7], [8] in particular.
The setup we assume by default is provided in Sec. 6.1. When other values
for some parameters are considered, this will be explicitly mentioned. In addi-
tion to the simulation setup subsection, the simulation section comprises three
subsections. The first subsection (Sec. 6.2) aims at conducting a performance
analysis in terms of utility function (1), which captures the tradeoff between
the transmission rate and the energy spent for transmitting. Sec. 6.3 focuses
on the transmission rate aspect while Sec. 6.4 is dedicated to a performance
analysis in terms of consumed network energy.
6.1 Simulation setup assumed by default
We consider a network of N nodes. When N is considered to be fixed, it will
be taken to be equal to 50. The N nodes are randomly placed (according
to a uniform probability distribution) over an area of 1000 × 1000 m2; only
network topology draws which guarantee every node to have a neighbor (in
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the sense of its radio range) are kept. The assumed topology corresponds to
a random topology since the node locations are drawn from a given spatial
distribution law (which is uniform for the simulations). Each node only con-
siders the behavior of its neighbors to choose its own behavior. As assumed in
the related literature, if a node has several neighbors, it is assumed to play a
given game with each of its neighbors. In fact, averaging the results over the
network topology realizations has the advantage of making the conclusions
less topology-dependent. Provided simulations are averaged over 1200 draws
for the network topology. Routes are supposed to be fixed and known. Indeed,
the proposed transmission strategy is compatible with any routing algorithm.
One node can communicate with another node only if the inter-node distance
is less than the radio range, which is taken to be 150 m. When a node has
several neighbors, it may be involved in several routing paths, then it is as-
sumed to play several independent forwarding games in parallel, and have a
given initial credit mi(0) for each neighbor. The credits are updated separately
based on the corresponding forwarding game. This means that the credits a
node receives by cooperating with one of its neighbors can only be used for
forwarding via the considered neighbor. As a node without neighbors does
not need credits and the nodes do not obtain an initial credit, the problem of
credit excess is avoided. By default, 50% of the nodes are assumed to be self-
ish but the network does not comprise any malicious node. The initial packet
forwarding rate for cooperative nodes and selfish nodes are respectively set to
1 and 0.1. Each source node transmits at a constant bit rate of 2 packets/s.
For each draw for the network topology, the simulation is run for 1000 s. This
period of time is made of 20 frames of 50 s. A frame corresponds to a game
stage and to a given draw for the channel vector h. The fact that channel gains
are assumed to fluctuate over time is a way of accounting for mobility; in the
simulations, they are assumed to evolve according to a (discrete version of the)
Rayleigh fading law. Averaging over network topologies allows one to average
the results over the path losses. Each channel gain is thus drawn according to
an exponential law, which corresponds to a Rayleigh law for the amplitude;
if one denotes by hi the considered channel gain, we have that hi ∼ 1hi e
−hi
hi ,
where hi = E(hi) represents the path loss effects. As mentioned above, the
channel gain is discrete and the discrete realizations are obtained by quantiz-
ing the realizations given by a Rayleigh distribution. The effect of quantization
on the performance is typically small. Simulations, which are provided here,
show that the loss induced by implementing Algorithm 1 by using quantized
channel gains in the presence of actual channel gains which are continuous is
about a few percents for the size of channel gain sets used for the simulations.
If d denotes the inter-node distance of the considered pair of nodes, then the
path loss is assumed to depend on the distance according to hi =
const
d2+κ2 ; κ > 0
is a distance which is used to avoid numerical divergence in d = 0. In prac-
tice, κ may typically represent the antenna height. During each frame, 100
packets are exchanged. Tab. 1 recaps the values chosen for the main network
parameters.
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Table 1 Simulation Settings
Network parameters Value
Space 1000 m × 1000 m
Number of nodes N = 50
Radio range 150 m
Const 103
κ 5 m
Initial credit mi(0) = 35
Initial credit of ICARUS [8] mi(0) = 220
Parameter cost β = 10
Cooperation degree µ = 20
Probability of misdetection ε = 0
Packet arrival rate ν = 1
Simulation time 1000 s
Frame/stage duration 50 s
Generosity parameter of GTFT 0.1
IFN of ICARUS [8] 5
edpth of ICARUS [8] 0.85
a of ICARUS [8] 0.5
b of ICARUS [8] 2.3
Number of topology draws 1200
Concerning the game parameters, the following choices are made by de-
fault. The parameter α is set to 10−2. The receive variance σ2 is always set
to 0.1. The sets of possible power levels are defined by: ∀i ∈ {1, 2},Pi = P ′i,
L = 10, Pmin = 0, Pmax = 10 W. The power increment is uniform over
a dB scale, starting from the minimal positive power which is taken to be
equal to 10 mW. The sets of possible channel gains are defined by: ∀i ∈
{1, 2},Hi = H′i: H = 10, hmin = 0.04, hmax = 10, and the channel gain in-
crement equals 10−0.0410 . The different means of the channel gains are given
by: (h̄i, h̄′i, h̄−i, h̄′−i) = (1, 1, 1, 1). The communication efficiency function is
chosen as in [26]: ϕ(x) = e−
c
x with c = 2r − 1, r being the spectral efficiency
in bit/s per Hz [26]. In the simulations provided we always have r = 1 bit/s
per Hz; one simulation will assume a higher spectral efficiency namely, r = 3
bit/s per Hz.
6.2 Utility analysis
Here, to be able to easily represent the utility region for the considered prob-
lem and to be able to compare our approach with previous models (with
the well-known forwarder’s dilemma model [2] in particular), we consider two
neighboring nodes.
The first question we want to answer is to know to what extent the ability
for a node to properly adapt to the link qualities which have an impact on
the weighted utility wλ = λu1 + (1−λ)u2, it is related to its knowledge about




2). To this end,
we have represented in Fig. 2, the achievable utility region under various
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information assumptions. The top curve in solid line represents the Pareto
frontier which is obtained when implementing the transmission strategy given
by Algorithm 1 when ∀i ∈ N , si = a0 = (h1, h′1, h2, h′2) that is, each node
has global CSI. The crosses correspond to the performance of the centralized
transmission strategy, namely the best performance possible. It is seen that for
a typical scenario the proposed algorithm does not involve any optimality loss.
The curve in dashed line is obtained with Algorithm 1 under local CSI i.e.,
si = (hi, h
′
i). Interestingly, the loss for moving from global CSI to local CSI
is relatively small. This shows that it is possible to implement a distributed
transmission strategy without sacrificing too much the global performance.
This result is not obvious since the weighted utility wλ depends on the whole
vector a0. When no CSI is available (i.e., si = constant), the incurred loss
is more significant. Indeed, the curve with diamonds (which is obtained by
choosing for each λ ∈ [0, 1] the best action profile in terms of the expected
weighted utility6 (11)) shows that the gain in terms of sum-utility or social
welfare when moving from no CSI to global CSI is about 10%. The point
marked by a star indicates the operating point for which transmitting at full
power ai = (Pmax, Pmax, Pmax, Pmax) is optimal under no CSI.
As a second step, we compare the performance of SARA, ICARUS [8] and
GTFT [17], that do not take into account the channel fluctuations. The three
corresponding equilibrium points are particular points of the achievable or
feasible utility region represented by Fig. 3. The outer curve is the achieved
utility region of Fig. 2 when Algorithm 1 is implemented under local CSI (it is
the same as the dashed line curve of Fig. 2). The social optimum corresponds
to the point indicated by the small disk. The point marked by a square corre-
sponds to the performance of SARA whereas, the points marked by a star and
a diamond respectively represent the equilibrium points obtained when using
ICARUS [8] and GTFT [17]. Note that the way the strategies ICARUS and
GTFT have been designed is such that they are able to adapt the packet for-
warding rates but not the transmit power level. As a consequence they cannot
exploit any available knowledge in terms of CSI, which induces a quite signif-
icant performance loss; it is assumed that GTFT and ICARUS use a pair of
actions (a1, a2) which maximizes the expected sum-utility. The gain obtained
by the proposed transmission strategy comes not only from the fact that the
transmit power level can adapt to the wireless link quality fluctuations, but
also from the proposed cooperation mechanism. The latter both exploits the
idea of virtual credit and reputation, which allows one to obtain a better packet
forwarding rate than ICARUS and GTFT. We elaborate more on this aspect
in the next subsection. At last, when implementing a transmission strategy
built from the one-shot game model given in Sec. 2, the NE of [2] would be
obtained i.e., the operating point would be (0, 0), which is very inefficient.
6 We therefore assume that the corresponding statistical knowledge is available and ex-
ploited.
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Centralized transmission strategy w. global CSI
SARA with global CSI and πi=1, i∈{1,2}
SARA with local CSI and πi=1
SARA without CSI and πi=1
Fig. 2 Achievable utility region under various scenarios of information for the nodes: global
CSI, local CSI, and no CSI.















SARA with local CSI and πi=1, i∈{1,2}




One shot game equilibrium
Fig. 3 Achievable utility region with local CSI and the repeated game equilibrium for
each strategy: SARA, ICARUS, and GTFT. The one-shot game Nash equilibrium is also
represented. The strategies ICARUS, and GTFT do not take into account the channel
fluctuations.
6.3 Packet forwarding rate analysis
In the previous subsection we have been assessing the benefits from imple-
menting the proposed transmission strategy in terms of utility. The utility
implements a tradeoff between the transmission rate and the consumed en-
ergy. Here, we want to know how good is the proposed strategy in terms of
packet forwarding rate that is, the packet transmission probability.
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Fig. 4 depicts the evolution of the packet forwarding rate for SARA,
ICARUS, and GTFT for a network of 50 nodes. We look at the influence
of the fraction of selfish nodes. SARA is very robust to selfishness. Whatever
the fraction of selfish nodes, SARA provides a high performance in terms of
packet forwarding rate. We see that ICARUS is less efficient than SARA in
terms of stimulating cooperation in the presence of selfish nodes, which shows
that the proposed punishment mechanism is effectively relevant. The GTFT
strategy performance decreases in a significant manner with the number of
selfish nodes. For the latter transmission strategy, it is seen that, when the
network is purely selfish, the operating packet forwarding rate is about 50%;
this shows the significant loss induced by using a cooperation scheme which is
not very robust to selfishness.
The robustness to observation errors is assessed. More precisely, we want
to evaluate the impact of not observing the action Forward or Drop perfectly
on the packet forwarding rate. Fig. 5 depicts the packet forwarding rate as
a function of the probability of misdetection ε (see (15)). When ε > 10%, the
performance of ICARUS sharply decreases. This is because the retaliation as-
pect becomes a dominant effect. Nodes punish each other whereas, they should
not; this is due to the fact that the estimates of the forwarding probabilities
become poor and the ICARUS mechanism is sensitive to estimation errors; il-
legitimate punishments are implemented, leading to a very inefficient network.
On the other hand, observation errors have little influence on SARA because
under the equilibrium condition, provided that the credit is less than µ, nodes
keep on cooperating. Estimating the forwarding rate does not intervene in the
decision process of a node. Note that we have only considered ε ≤ 50%. The
reason for this is as follows. When ε > 50% it is always possible, by symmetry,
to decrease the effective probability of misdetection to ε′ = 1 − ε. For this, it
suffices to declare the used action to be Forward whereas, the action Drop was
observed, and vice-versa.
6.4 Consumed network energy analysis
Based on the preceding two sections, we know that SARA provides improve-
ments in terms of utility and packet forwarding rate. But the most significant
improvements are in fact obtained in terms of consumed energy, which is also
observed in [39], where time-varying channels are exploited to find the op-
timal instants to communicate. Indeed, ICARUS and GTFT have not been
designed to account for link quality fluctuations whereas, SARA both adapts
the packet forwarding rate and the transmit power level using the parameters
assumed by default, except for the path loss hi =
const
d2+κ2 , where const=10
3
and κ = 5. In the current formulation of ICARUS and GTFT, the trans-
mit power is fixed (as in Sec. 6.2) according to the best pair of actions in
terms of expected sum-utility. In this subsection, the advantage of adapting
the power to the quality of the wireless link is clearly observed. Since the
consumed network energy is proportional to the network sum-power averaged
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Fig. 4 Packet forwarding rate for different values for the proportion of selfish nodes. The
results are averaged over 1200 executions, using the simulation setup assumed by default.





























Fig. 5 Packet forwarding rate for different values for the probability of misdetection ε. The
results are averaged over 1200 executions, using the simulation setup assumed by default.
over time, we will work with the average network power (ANP). Here we con-
sider the total power which is effectively consumed by the node and not the
radiated powers pi and p
′
i (the consumed power therefore includes the cir-
cuit power in particular). As explained e.g., in [40], [41], [42], a reasonable
and simple model for relating the radiated power and the consumed power
is the affine model: pi,total = a(pi + p
′
i) + b. The parameter b is very impor-
tant since it corresponds to the power consumed by the node when no packet
is transmitted; in [41], [42] it represents the circuit power whereas, in [40] it
represents the node computation power. Here we assume as in [42] that b is
24 Sara Berri et al.
comparable to the Pmax and choose the same typical values as in [42] namely,
b = Pmax = 1 W. Eventually, the ANP is obtained by averaging the following
quantity
∑N
i=1 {a[pi(t) + p′i(t)]πi(t) + b} over all channel and network topol-
ogy realizations, where N is always the number of nodes in the network and






{a[pi(t) + p′i(t)]πi(t) + b} (21)
where T ′ corresponds to the number of realizations used for averaging. Here,
this quantity is averaged over 1200 × 20 stages, the number of network re-
alizations being 1200 and the number of channel realizations being 20. Fig.
6 shows how the ANP in dBm scales with the number of nodes for SARA,
ICARUS, and GTFT. It is seen that the ANP and therefore the total energy
consumed by the network can be divided by more than 2 (the gain is about 4
dB to be more precise) showing the importance of addressing the problem of
packet forwarding and power control jointly.




















Fig. 6 The figure depicts the average total power (in dBm) or equivalently the total energy
consumed by the network against the total number of nodes in the network. It is seen that
SARA allows the energy consumed by the network to be divided by more than 2 when
compared to the state-of-the art strategies ICARUS, and GTFT that do not take into
account the channel fluctuations.
6.5 Impact of quantizing channel gains
As motivated in the System Model section, one strong argument for assuming
discrete channel gains is that, technically, it corresponds to the most general
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case; the continuous case follows by using standard information-theoretic ar-
guments. But, from a practical point of view, it matters to assess the loss
induced by using an algorithm which exploits quantized channel gains instead
of continuous ones. Fig. XXX represents the performance in terms of XXX as
a function of XXX. It is seen that the performance obtained by using discrete
channel gains in the proposed algorithm whereas, the actual channel gains are
continuous is typically small. Here the parameters have been chosen as follows:
XXX....
7 Conclusion
One of the contributions of this work is to generalize the famous and insightful
model of the forwarder’s dilemma [2] by accounting for channel gain fluctua-
tions. Therefore, the problem of knowledge about global channel state appears,
in addition to the problem of imperfect action monitoring when the interac-
tion is repeated. In this paper, we have seen that it is possible to characterize
the best performance of the studied system even in the presence of partial in-
formation; the corresponding observation structure is arbitrary provided. The
observations are generated by discrete observation structures denoted by k and
Γ . In terms of performance, designing power control policies which exploit the
available knowledge as well as possible is shown to lead to significant gains.
Since, we are in presence of selfish nodes, we propose a mechanism to stimulate
cooperation among nodes. The proposed mechanism is both reputation-based
and credit-based. For the reputation aspect, one of the novel features of the
proposed strategy is that it generalizes the concept of tit-for-tat to a context
where actions are not necessarily binary. For the credit aspect, we propose
an evolution law for the credit which is shown to be efficient and robust to
selfishness and especially imperfect action monitoring.
From the quantitative aspect, the proposed transmission strategy (referred
to as SARA) Pareto-dominates ICARUS and GTFT for the utility, the packet
forwarding rate, and the energy consumed by the network. Significant gains
have been observed; one very convincing result is that the energy consumed
by the network can be divided by 2 when the packet forwarding problem and
the power control problem are addressed jointly.
This paper provides the characterization of the best performance in terms
of transmission strategy under partial information. Although all performed
simulations show that the optimality loss appears to be small, there is no
guarantee that the proposed algorithm provides an optimal solution of the op-
timization problem to be solved to operate on the Pareto-frontier or the utility
region. Providing such a guarantee would constitute a valuable extension of
the present work. Another significant extension would be to relax the i.i.d.
assumption on the network state. In this work, the network state corresponds
to the global channel state and the i.i.d. assumption is known to be reasonable
but, in other setups, where the state represents e.g., a queue length, a buffer
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size, or a battery level, the used framework would need to be extended since
Markov decision processes would be involved.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
First, it has to be noticed that long-term utilities are linear images of the
implementable distribution. Therefore, characterizing the achievable utility
region amounts to characterizing the set of implementable distributions. Note
that the set of implementable characterization does not depend on the assumed
choice for the infinite sequence of weights (θt)t≥1, making the result valid for
both considered models of repeated games (namely, the classical infinitely
repeated game and the model with discount).
Second, to obtain the set of implementable distributions we exploit the
implementability theorem derived in [14]. Therein, it is proved that under the
main assumptions of the present paper (namely, the network state is i.i.d. and
the observation structure is memoryless) a joint distribution is implementable
if and only if it factorizes as in (22). That is, a joint probability distribution
or correlation Q(a0, a1, a2) is implementable if and only if it factorizes as:
Q(a0, a1, a2) =
∑
v,s1,s2
ρ(a0)PV (v)× k(s1, s2|a0)×
PA1|S1,V (a1|s1, v)PA2|S2,V (a2|s2, v). (22)
Third, a key observation to be made now is that if two probability distri-
butions Q1 and Q2 are implementable, then the convex combination µQ1 +
(1− µ)Q2 is implementable. Indeed, if there is a transmission strategy to im-
plement Q1 and an other to implement Q2 then by using the first one
T1
T
of the time and the second one T−T1T of the time, and making T1 large such
that T1T → µ, µQ1 + (1 − µ)Q2 becomes implementable. It follows that the
long-term utility region is convex. Therefore, the Pareto frontier of the utility
region, which characterizes the utility region, can be obtained by maximizing
the weighted utility Wλ. This concludes the proof.
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Proof We want to prove the following result.
The strategy profile (σ?i , σ
?






















i − u2i ).
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u1i = ui(a0, a
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1, a






i = ui(a0, a




As a preliminary, we first review the one-shot deviation ”principle” in the
context of interest. This ”principle” is one of the elements used to prove the
desired result.
One-shot deviation principle: For Node i the one-shot deviation prin-
ciple from strategy σi is a strategy σ̃i writes as:





The two strategies σ̃i and σi therefore produce identical actions except at
stage τ .
Definition 3 For Node i the one-shot deviation σ̃i from strategy σi is not
profitable if:
Ui(σi, σ−i) ≥ Ui(σ̃i, σ−i), (25)
with σ̃i 6= σi.
Let us exploit the one-shot deviation principle to prove the result, since it
is well known that a strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and
only if there are no profitable one-shot deviations. Assume that for a given
game history, the distributions used by Nodes i and −i are respectively πi
and π−i. Following the proposed strategy σ
?
i,t defined by (15), and by using
(14) and (17), one can obtain the distribution of a node i, πi(t), from π−i for
each stage t. As defined by relation (17), at each stage t, if mi(t) ≥ µ, Node i
chooses a distribution πi(t) = π̂−i(t− 1) stipulating that amin = (Pmin, Pmin)
and a?i (t) = f
?
i (si(t)) are the only actions that could be chosen with a positive
probability. Thus, it would be sufficient to provide only the kth component of
πi(t), which is denoted by π
k








(1− 2ε)tπ−i + ε
∑t−1
k=0(1− 2ε)k, if mod(t, 2) = 1;
(1− 2ε)tπi + ε
∑t−1
k=0(1− 2ε)k, if mod(t, 2) = 0.
Now, we define a one-shot deviation. We consider that Node i deviates unilat-
erally at one stage from the proposed strategy σ?i,t, by choosing σ̃i,t. If Node i
deviates, it will be in order to save energy, thus it chooses amin with a higher
probability than the one provided by the proposed strategy σ?i,t. Therefore, we
consider that σ̃i,t defines a distribution over the action set as follows (26):
π̃i(t) = πi(t)− d.( −1︸︷︷︸
amin
, 0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
a?
, 0, . . .), (26)
where: d ∈ [0, 1], and πi(t) is the distribution given by σ?i,t, and whose kth
component is defined above.
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πki (t), if mod(t, 2) = 0;




πk−i(t)− d(1− 2ε)t−1, if mod(t, 2) = 0;
πk−i(t). if mod(t, 2) = 1.
Now, to accomplish the proof we need to define the associated expected utilities







Pt(a0, a1, a2)ui(a0, a1, a2), (27)
where: Pt is the joint probability distribution, and ui the instantaneous utility






i = ui(a0, a
?
1, a
min), u2i = ui(a0, a
min, a?2),
and umini = ui(a0, a
min, amin). a?i = f
?
i (si), and a
min = (Pmin, Pmin). By means













(1− πki (t))πk−i(t)u2i + (1− πki (t))(1− πk−i(t))umini ]. (28)














(1− π̃ki (t))π̃k−i(t)u2i + (1− π̃ki (t))(1− π̃k−i(t))umini ]. (29)
As the deviation distribution π̃i depends on the distribution provided by the
proposed strategy σ?i , πi, one can also define ũi,t as a function of u
?
i,t, by using








1(t) if mod(t, 2) = 0;




2(t) if mod(t, 2) = 1,
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where: Ŭ1(t) = πki (t)(u
k
i − u1i + umini − u2i ) + u2i − umini , and Ŭ2(t) =
πk−i(t)(u
k
i − u1i + umini − u2i ) + u1i − umini . Thus, the deviation utility of Node i












where: z is the number of stages until the condition mi < µ is satisfied. The
unilaterally deviation from the proposed strategy σ?i is not profitable if:
Ui(σ̃i, σ
?
−i) ≤ Ui(σ?i , σ?−i). (30)



























2(2t+ 2)) ≥ 0. (31)
We have, Ŭ1(2t + 1) = πki (2t + 1)(u
k
i − u1i + umini − u2i ) + u2i − umini , and
Ŭ2(2t+ 2) = πk−i(2t+ 2)(u
k
i − u1i + umini − u2i ) + u1i − umini . We provide results
for πki (2t + 1) = π
k
−i(2t + 2) = 1, which implies that relation (31) is satisfied
for each πki (2t + 1) and π
k















i − u2i )δ
t= z2−1∑
t=0
δ2t(1− 2ε)2t+1 ≥ 0.
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Thus, the strategy profile (σ?i , σ
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